A glance at recent history is always insightful in the study of geopolitics and geosecurity. Let’s rewind to 1990—a pivotal year on the global stage. At the time, I had just returned with the last elements of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka and was headed to an Army cantonment in a ‘peace’ location. However, our plans quickly changed when we were diverted to Punjab. We were to form the frontline of forces crossing the River Sutlej to counter Pakistan’s intransigence—its launch of Exercise Zarb-e-Momin and its sponsorship of militancy and terror in Punjab. Zarb-e-Momin, a military training manoeuvre with operational intent, was designed to send a message and divert our attention. Meanwhile, conflict was also brewing in Kashmir, setting the stage for a broader geopolitical confrontation.
The Story Of Al Qaeda
It was the end of the Cold War. The Berlin Wall had just fallen, and the Soviets were still withdrawing from Afghanistan. Punjab was in turmoil, diverting strategic attention in multiple directions. The Iran-Iraq War had ended just a few years earlier. Victorious jihadis from across the Islamic world were emerging from the rubble of Afghanistan in 1990. This description covers only a small section of the world then. It does not even touch on Africa, which was also emerging from the shadows of old conflicts in Somalia, Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, and beyond.
Leaving everything else aside, I often ask myself: where did Al Qaeda come from? The answer traces back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which triggered a global call for jihad against the Soviets. The US, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan supported the Afghan mujahideen with funding, weapons, and training to counter Soviet influence. Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi, joined the war effort, organising foreign fighters and logistical support. This network later evolved into Al Qaeda, founded in 1988.
When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, bin Laden and other jihadists saw it as a victory for Islam over a superpower. As the Cold War ended in 1991, the US and its allies disengaged from Afghanistan, leaving a power vacuum. Many foreign jihadists, including bin Laden, believed their next mission was to fight Western influence—particularly the US, which they saw as the next “occupying power”.
How Al Qaeda Became a Global Jihadi Network
After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden offered his mujahideen to defend Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi government rejected him, inviting US forces instead. This marked his formal break with the US and its allies, transforming Al Qaeda from an anti-Soviet group into a global jihadist movement.
Al Qaeda’s rise was deeply tied to the Cold War’s conclusion. The Soviet-Afghan War provided the military experience, networks, and ideology that fuelled its creation. After defeating the Soviets, the US and its allies abandoned Afghanistan, allowing extremism to fester. Bin Laden and his followers redirected their jihad against the West, leading to the global terrorist threats we face today.
From this, several lessons follow. First, whenever the world emerges from a period of intense activity and lowers its guard, it is often struck by unconventional turbulence. This happened in 1989-90 with the onset of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, just as it did with the civil wars in Africa between 1990 and 1995. The movements in Chechnya and Bosnia were also linked to the events of this period. More recently, the withdrawal of US and Coalition troops from Iraq in 2011 ultimately paved the way for the rise of ISIS (Daesh).
Although ISIS suffered military defeats in Mosul and Baghuz, it was only partially displaced, finding refuge in Afghanistan’s northern badlands. Al Qaeda maintained a presence there, alongside Central Asian and Pakistani terrorist groups. Meanwhile, the Taliban remains reclusive and untrustworthy.
Remnants of ISIS also persist in Kurdish-held areas along the Syria-Turkey border, and the risk of its resurgence remains real. If northern Syria and the Turkish border region remain unstable, ISIS could exploit these conditions to rebuild its networks and launch new offensives. The combination of weak governance, regional infighting, and existing ISIS sleeper cells makes this an ongoing and serious threat.
So, where does this lead? In the first month of the new US President’s tenure, the world order is already facing serious disruption. As global attention is drawn to Ukraine, Gaza, the Indo-Pacific, trade disputes, and tariffs, seemingly small issues continue to develop, often with the potential to spiral into major crises. Remember how ISIS emerged in June 2014?
We must consider the long-term consequences of the mass destruction in Gaza. An entire generation of Palestinian youth now lives without hope—a sentiment that extends beyond the youth to the entire population. For those who have endured such loss and suffering, revenge and retribution become powerful emotions, and the blame is often placed on the entire world. This creates fertile ground for terror groups.
If you wonder how these groups sustain themselves—with resources, fighters, and finances—we have seen repeatedly that these are no longer significant obstacles. Ideologies are abundant, and a cause (whether perceived as just or unjust) is never difficult to manufacture when retribution is the driving force.
How Will Current Gaza Turmoil Manifest Itself
There is no formal or direct linkage between Palestinian groups and ISIS. The latter follows an extreme Salafi-jihadist ideology and has often criticised Palestinian factions, including Hamas, for being too nationalistic and failing to embrace its vision of global jihad. However, under a desperate bid for survival, Hamas could change its stance, potentially opening the door to some level of cooperation with ISIS.
Hezbollah, a Shia organisation with direct allegiance to Iran, remains a priority for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). While Hezbollah and Hamas have historically aligned on certain fronts, Hamas’s ideology is not far removed from ISIS-style radicalism, with its influence and objectives potentially spreading beyond Palestine to other parts of the Arab world. That is a concern, particularly for regional stability.
On February 5, 2025, during the Kashmir Solidarity Day event in Rawalakot, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Hamas representatives—Khalid Qaddoumi and Naji Zaheer—were present. They received notable attention from members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), marking the first instance of Hamas officials participating in an event in PoK. While this may not yet signify a formal alliance, it indicates a growing effort to establish wider networks in the realm of transnational terrorism—also referred to as global terrorism. Similar patterns of revival could emerge in East and West Africa, where Al Shabab and Boko Haram maintain strongholds.
My point is simple: While the world’s attention is consumed by major geopolitical concerns—such as European security, NATO’s future, the displacement of Palestinians, and the resumption of US-Russia cooperation—there must be dedicated strategic minds focused on smaller conflicts. These so-called “small wars” have the potential to reshape global security in ways far more destabilising than we may currently imagine.
(The writer is a Member of the National Disaster Management Authority, Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir, and Former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author