When we see how people vote in elections and why they choose some parties, analysis often focuses on age, education, location or socio -economic status. There is less discussion in Britain. But its two-thirds of its close to adults are still religious-or they express religious identity, have religious beliefs, or participate in religious activities.
For one-three adults in the UK, who are Christians, this identity is a significant impact on their political behavior. The new voting published here for the first time shows how Improvement Britain is interrupting our previous understanding of how Christians vote in British elections.
Relations between British Christian communities and major political parties go back to centuries. conservative Party Has been very close to english Anglicons Since its emergence in the mid -19th century. Catholic and free-church Protestants (such as baptists and methodists) have moved to labor and liberal/liberal democrats parties. Even when Britain has become more secular, these relationships have remained.
For example, Anglican still voted for the conservative when the party was in strict straits. In the 2024 election, 39% Anglican voted for Tory, even the party’s national vote share fell to 24%.
Since the 1980s and especially in elections since 2015, however, we have started seeing changes in Christian vote. Traditional Catholic attachment for labor has deteriorated, as labor appeals for other Christian communities such as baptists, methodists and presbyterians.
Instead, inspired by the increasing gentleness of social values (immigration, social change and national identity) as a determinant of political support, all the stripes of all stripes have raised support for conservatives by socially conservative inclinations of some Christians. And those who traditionally used to do this – Anglican – have become even more helpful. The result has been a stable co -co -opinion of the Christian vote behind the conservators.
But now, new voting by yougov (23-24 June 2025) for the University of Exeter suggests that the growth popularity of the UK is disrupting this feeling.
Instead of asking that people would vote for tomorrow, a national representative sample of 2,284 adults was asked how much they are ever voting for each major party, on a scale of zero (very probable) to ten (very probable).
While no one will vote in an election, not as a direct question, the possibility provides a very rich measure of the strength of their support for all major parties.
Among the Anglican, the labor remains depth to the depth: more than half gave the party 0. Conversely, conservatives still enjoy strong support between Anglican, 35% gave them the possibility of seven or more votes – the support for the party in one election.
Correction, however, is caught. Despite only 15% Anglican voting reforms in 2024, 38% now consider the possibility of voting for the party high. This is similar to the same ratio that is strongly opposed to improvement – showing that the party polarizes more anglican than orthodoxy, improvement can win more as Anglican support as torizes in an election.
Catholic shows a similar trend. Labor’s traditional support is disappearing: 40% of Catholics stated that they have zero the possibility of voting labor, while 29% are strong supporters. With conservatives for anglican vote, improvement is with labor for Catholic vote at around 28%. Even it has suppressed conservatives, out of which 22% of Catholic are strong supporters.
It is not yet clear why this is happening. Christians (and non-Christian) voting patterns are not an art of age-there are many studies that prove that this is the case.
It may be that the stance of improvement on issues like immigration is echoed to the extent that they are ready to separate their historical party loyalty. Or it may be that Christians are equally prone to other British voters, which change from disappointment with the performance of labor and conservatives in the office.
Swing voter and party competition
This data also shows to what extent the voters’ support for parties overlaps or is exclusive. In other words, which voters have the possibility of high votes for only one party (and therefore is committed to supporting the party in an election), in which there is no such high possibility for any party (and so perhaps it will not vote at all), and who effectively hold more than one party (effectively swing voters, in a way or others).
Religious, 29% are not strong supporters of any party. For Catholic, it is 26%. Anglicans are more politically anchored, however, with only 20% in this category.
Traditionally, we would have expected to reflect the greater tendency of Anglican to support Toryse, only 17% Anglicans are only strong supporters of that party, compared to 21% that is strongly behind the improvement. These are not swing voters; They have changed the sides.
Another 12% of Anglican is likely to have high votes for both Toriz and improvement. These are swing voters that both sides can expect to win really.
Catholic is even more fragmented. Only 13% only 12% and 17% -with strong supporters of labor alone, who are strong supporters of conservatives respectively and improve alone.
Some Catholic are torn between labor and other parties, but 5% are swing voters amid stereotypes and reforms: the gradual victory of toris over Catholics in the last 50 years is also being challenged by an appeal for reform.
The party has provided a socially conservative option to conservatives, resulting in more fragmented Christian vote. Torys are no longer the main beneficiaries of the loss of their traditional Catholic vote of Labor.
In addition, improvement is as conservatives among the anglican as conservatives, and as labor among Catholics. This suggests that it is appealing to divide traditional sects more successfully than a major parties.
If there is a single party that attracts the bulk of Britain’s Christian support, at this point it is more likely to improve than anyone else.
Stuart Fox A senior lecturer in politics is the University of Exeter.
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