Small bilateral meeting – one first – between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bangladeshi Interim Cabinet head Mohammad Yunus, held more ophthalmology than the proceedings of the summit. The meeting was not about the two leaders of the region, who were using the opportunity to discuss outstanding issues, but a cooling-off moment for the two neighbors whose relationship was ‘complex’. Apparently, a lot of water has been washed away between the two states in the last eight months, as Sheikh Hasina fled Dhaka and sought refuge in India on August 5 last year. Certainly, there have been some other official bilateral meetings in the last few months, but given that India had earlier denied Yunus’s requests for chat with PM Modi, it begs some of the latest questions in Bangkok.
Was the meeting a type of reconciliation? Or was it about keeping with the pretense of normal relationships? Or, did some big calculations require photo-up opportunity? Changes in Indian mood are curious, especially in the backdrop of Younus, another controversy created with its statement. Last week, Younus said during an incident in China that because India’s north -east was “landlocked”, the Bangladesh region had a primary entrance to the maritime access and it could be a “expansion of the Chinese economy”. Not only was this factually wrong, but the Bangladeshi invitation for China is a controversial gesture to say a minimum to make an airbase near the Siliguri Corridor of India in Lalmanirhat district. This suggestion has also raised eyebrows in the US, as it effectively draws Bangladesh into an Indo-Pacific strategic place. In any case, at the later stage of Hasina, India’s limited engagement and the transfer priorities of the US have actually led to the risk of deep Chinese engagement in Bangladesh.
Was it late for India to work?
Since Yunus took over as an interim chief on August 8 last year, India has found it difficult to face the changed political scenario in Bangladesh. The shock of losing his best partner in the neighborhood brought out many serious implications, as it was revealed in a few months. While India eventually admitted that it was understood that Hasina was losing a popular mandate in her fight with students, it could not affect any changes of the track in Dhaka.
Over the past few years, after controlling the general election of January 2024, Hasina was indicated that Hasina lost contact with the ground realities as she rapidly tightened her administrative hold. But India still hoped that it would be able to hang through the final teathers. Finally, however, a Dhaka Sans Hasina left an interval hole in the wall for India. It also failed to build any linkage with new dispensation. The rule of congestion on the streets of Dhaka and visible domestic instability also provided easy material to many Indian classes, as well as to build their negative tale.
Yunus’s inability to operate his country, in view of the disability of the law-and the order, and more importantly, the large-scale violence provoked the Hindu minorities of the country, providing India a linear approach to judge the new dispens. The increasing presence of nationwide religious elements, as well as crying about the arrow against the Awami League in Bangladesh, and a ‘Islamist acquisition’ of Bangladesh, inhabited the Indian discourse. Any attempt to support a runaway interim cabinet that was trying to stabilize a difficult and unstable situation, became an option. In contrast, Bangladesh was viewed through a emotional lens of ‘It-Can-Can-to-Down-Up-Ab-Ab’. The hostile cry had shrunk equally on both sides, especially from media and political circles.
Anti -India hysteria
Many irritable over the years have continued to emphasize India-Bangladesh relations despite their firm foundation. It includes a water-sharing agreement on the Teesta River, border action against the citizens of both sides, and, most importantly, a growing perception in Bangladesh is that most bilateral agreements between the two nations liked India more. This notion was linked in Hasina’s style of politics, where policies were set without any public debate and discussion, given the absence of real opposition from Parliament.
All this was added to the anti-India hysteria in Bangladesh and always young groups suggested a review of some of these decisions, furthering the trust’s deficit. The Hasina government was rapidly cut off from the youth of the country, and Hasina herself failed to deal with criticism (although at present, Bangladesh’s politics shows the slaves of similar intolerant behavior). Dhaka’s strong diplomatic overlapping for Pakistan and China also joined the misunderstanding.
Dhaka’s strong outreach
While some quarters in India recently saw the meeting as the acceptance of the style of Yunus government’s politics, the meeting is unlikely to change the current status of bilateral relations. This provides a different purpose: the target is not to embrace the Unus government, but perhaps to ensure that Bangladesh does not turn into a neighbor who is exploited by hostile forces.
Moving forward, the issue of extradition of Sheikh Hasina from India will remain a sticky point, given the complex validity involved in such a case. Both India and Bangladesh will have to find a modus Veni to cross their different positions.
Overall, the Modi-Unus meeting should be seen as a good gesture, and nothing more. Bilateral franca conversation was a useful exercise as India’s main objective is to proceed to inclusive multilateral elections and entry into a stable democratic government. But it will be a long race by then. Political witch-shikars have to be stopped, while various political stakeholders have to be converted on a normal path before free and fair elections. Obviously, there is a Bangladesh beyond Hasina, and only Indian support, not the sensor, can shape stable and fruitful bilateral relations in the coming days.
(Professor, Jindal School of International Affairs, op Jindal Global University)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
