There is likely to be hectic activity at the Ministry of External Affairs as reports point to a visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Washington in just a week. That’s unusual. Normally, an event of this magnitude would take months of preparation by both sides. A White House ‘official’ has even confirmed that Modi will visit the US on February 12, meeting the President the next day. True, there already had been rumours of Modi possibly making a trip to Washington, especially after a scheduled visit to Paris to co-chair the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit. So far, however, the Ministry has been quiet on the Washington visit, even as a hail of preparatory actions are evident in the run-up to it.
Irritants Upfront: Dollars And Such
The initial winds did not seem good. As President-elect, Trump was threatening tariffs against the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) grouping, demanding that they abandon any talk of moving away from the dollar and having a separate currency.
That fear is not insubstantial. In recent times, the group has expanded to include Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Egypt, and some 34 countries have submitted an expression of interest in joining the bloc of major emerging economies. Imposing tariffs against all of them would indeed be a challenge, but any move towards de-dollarisation is certain to invite some form of American retribution. Until recently, nearly 100% of oil trading was conducted in US dollars. But, in 2023, a fifth of oil trade was reportedly done under non-US dollar currencies
The BRICS ‘unit’—if it materialises—will be backed by a basket of currencies of the respective member countries. Among them, the yuan will be the strongest. This is a reality that hardly serves Delhi’s interests. Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar has since denied the possibility of any backing of such steps, indicating that it is neither ‘policy’ nor ‘strategy’ to consider de-dollarisation.
That’s move number one, and a very swift one indicating that in a consensus-based grouping, India will stand aligned with US interests, at least in this case.
The Deportation Spree
The second concern is the Trumpian threat to illegal migrants and the weaponising of tariffs, which saw Columbia first putting up a fight but then caving in in a matter of hours, agreeing to take back all undocumented migrants. China bowed, too, as nearly five flights sent back undocumented Chinese immigrants from America.
India, however, was quick off the mark, with Jaishankar in his press interaction noting that while Delhi wanted ‘legal mobility’ for its citizens, it was against illegal migration and all the other related threats it entails. The issue was clearly raised in his meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as a read-out confirmed. It was broached ‘gently’, with the main text stressing continuing cooperation.
Days later, India confirmed that it was taking back 18,000 identified migrants, with some 205 being sent back to Amritsar, even as orders were given to ensure that bureaucratic procedures were in place. The trouble is there is a lot more where that came from. Last year, US data indicated that some 90,105 people were trying to enter the country illegally, with Indians totalling some 3% of them. That’s a lot, and it’s not an issue that can be resolved easily or quickly.
Those Pesky Tariffs Don’t Exist
The recently unveiled Union budget also made some significant announcements, again pre-empting America’s tariff threats. It did away with peak tariff rates of 150%, 125% and 100% on imports. These actually applied to just five items, including the contentious Harley Davidson motorcycles and imported Tesla cars (as well as Japanese vehicles and other bikes). While duties have been slashed, a cess remains, which goes to the Centre. This can be used flexibly at any point.
Meanwhile, import duties on the top 30 items exported by the US to India—crude oil, coking coal, aeroplanes, and liquefied natural gas (already minimal) being the top ones—are anyway in the range of zero to 7.5%. All this is very good optics, with the data apparently shared with US officials, and the message going out that India is not, in fact, a ‘high tariff’ country.
And Then, China
The positive messages from Washington were also many, with Jaishankar being the first top diplomat to meet with his counterpart, and the scheduling of the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting immediately after the inauguration being seen as Trump reinforcing his backing of the grouping. That’s also a clear signal to China from the White House, which analysts seem to have missed amid all the bonhomie seen in the call between President Xi and Trump—in which, according to the latter’s tweet, Xi promised to work for a peaceful world.
Words, however, are cheap. True, with Trump promising to ‘take over’ the Gaza strip in his meeting with Israel’s Netanyahu recently, the focus on the Middle East is unlikely to change. True also that Trump is to call the Chinese President soon—this after he promised 60% tariffs against Beijing but ultimately imposed a mere 10%. In any case, these tariffs are actually linked to narcotics trafficking, something Beijing too sees as a threat rather than trade. China, in turn, fired off the launch of DeepSeek immediately after, which topped download charts and wiped billions of dollars off the market of Nvidia, sending the signal that the country can retaliate in multiple ways. The actual retaliation by Beijing in terms of tariffs was relatively mild in hard terms. Expect more negotiation ahead.
An Unchanging Constant
However, what is not open to negotiation is one constant in the US National Security Strategy: it states unambiguously that the US doesn’t tolerate competitors or challenges from other powers. This was Trump’s outlook, too, in 2017, and it will likely be even more magnified now. A rising China will not be tolerated. And Trump, being what he is, will want other powers to step up. That includes not just allies, but also ‘friends’ like India. Prepare to step up to the plate, with—as the White House readout made clear—more weapons buys from the US. ‘Strategic autonomy’ is going to get more difficult to maintain, at least in terms of managing Beijing’s perceptions. The point, ultimately, is that China is going to be front and centre of US policy.
For India, this can be a huge opportunity. The proposed US-India Defence Cooperation Act 2024, introduced by Rubio, back then a Senator, is an example. It treats India at par with US allies, placing it on nearly the same footing as them in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) in terms of provision of defence equipment. On the question of transfer of technology, however, there is not much at present. This point will need to be added to a future proposal to make it attractive to India and to boost not just the Indian defence industry but the economy as a whole, on which everything else rests.
And, these additions will need a Trumpian heave to get past Washington bureaucracy—something the US President is already battling with. The question now is, is the US President convinced that a strong India is in America’s interests? And, is India ready to go the whole hog in the Indo-Pacific in specific military terms?
Those are the two key questions, and on them will depend much of the friendship between US and India. The rest is merely window dressing.
(Tara Kartha is a former director of the National Security Council Secretariat)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author