Between 2020 and 2025, Baloch separatist insurgents carried out at least 14 documented attacks against Chinese nationals, resulting in 20 fatalities and 34 injuries. More than 400 Pakistani security personnel have also died in similar attacks. Despite this sustained militant activity—particularly by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)—the Baloch separatist movement has not posed an existential threat to Pakistan. The movement has maintained unity and focus, with various factions operating without internal divisions. Alongside militant insurgents, rights groups have also been active.
Two Activists
The late Karima Baloch, former chairperson of the Baloch Students Organization-Azad (BSO-Azad), advocated for Baloch rights and independence despite living in exile in Canada due to threats and state persecution. Even from abroad, she remained a powerful international voice for the Baloch cause. Her mysterious death in Toronto in December 2020—widely suspected by Baloch activists to be an assassination orchestrated by Pakistani intelligence agencies—became a rallying point for the Baloch diaspora, bringing global attention to their struggle.
Another prominent activist is Mahrang Baloch, a young doctor and human rights advocate who has emerged as a leading figure in the current Baloch rights movement. Known for her protests against enforced disappearances—particularly after her father was abducted and killed by security forces—she and many others call for provincial autonomy, devolution of education and social justice, as well as a peaceful resolution to Balochistan’s conflict.
What The Baloch Movement Really Is About
I highlight these figures because, amid the recent train hijacking and the alleged killing of several Pakistani servicemen, many may have overlooked the fact that the Baloch independence movement is not solely about violent separatism. A non-militant front has long been active, though the Pakistani establishment and deep state have largely ignored it. It often takes a high-profile act of violence—such as 9/11, the October 7 Hamas attack, or the December 16, 2014, Peshawar Army School attack—to jolt a state into acknowledging an emerging threat.
The BLA’s hijacking of the Jaffar Express on March 13 and the alleged killing of numerous Pakistani security personnel after the release of innocent passengers have given the militant separatist movement in Balochistan unprecedented momentum. This event was designed for mass impact, much like the October 7 Hamas attack in 2023 at the Gaza-Israel border, which resulted in 1,200 deaths and nearly 250 hostages being taken. Just as Hamas sought to revive the Palestinian issue amid concerns that the Abraham Accords would sideline it, the BLA aimed to reinvigorate the Baloch separatist movement and prevent it from losing steam.
Aggression Can’t Be Default
Additionally, the Baloch may have perceived the recent surge in terrorist attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a competing force dominating Pakistan’s security landscape. With the world at a crossroads in an unpredictable new order, the BLA’s actions were intended to attract global attention and sympathy. However, such a bold move is also likely to provoke a severe and prolonged response from Pakistan’s political and security establishment—an approach that has historically been its default response, rather than seeking dialogue or negotiation. This very mindset led to the separation of Bangladesh in 1971, as Pakistan failed to recognise the power of the people or its own shortcomings in crisis management.
Pakistan is no stranger to violence or to the aggressive responses it has traditionally favoured. However, Balochistan’s terrain does not lend itself to an easy counterinsurgency fight—any military engagement risks entangling Pakistan in an extended, unwinnable conflict. Deploying additional troops, helicopters, and other force multipliers creates vulnerable assets on the ground, and given that Balochistan makes up over 40% of Pakistan’s territory, the state cannot effectively control it all.
History Lessons
Pakistan has experience dealing with separatist militancy and terrorism, but it has never succeeded in completely neutralising such movements. The most glaring example is East Pakistan—now Bangladesh—where Yahya Khan’s heavy-handed approach led to the region’s eventual secession. The Pakistan Army’s leadership has long been steeped in a culture of machismo, believing that applying greater force than the adversary will resolve all problems. This approach offers temporary reprieve at best—never a permanent solution. Yahya Khan followed it in 1971, with disastrous consequences.
A similar dynamic unfolded in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), where the military deployed helicopter gunships, tanks, and artillery, razing entire villages to deny the TTP its support base. Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014–2018) brought temporary peace, but the Pakistan Army mistakenly believed it had achieved lasting success. The flaw in Pakistan’s counterinsurgency doctrine is its failure to grasp the nuances of conflict resolution and termination. This is evident not only in asymmetric warfare but also in conventional military strategy—seen most notably in the Kargil conflict, where General Pervez Musharraf miscalculated that surprise and deception would secure Pakistan a victory. He failed to anticipate India’s professional and determined response.
Pakistan now faces a similarly grave miscalculation in Balochistan. Whether it acknowledges it or not, the situation demands more than just brute force—it requires a fundamental shift in strategy, one that prioritises political engagement over military suppression.
The TTP Experience
A temporary lull in the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) operations led to the flawed assumption that it had been defeated. In reality, the TTP’s core sustenance and support came from across the border in Afghanistan. It was revived the moment the Taliban began pursuing broader ambitions of establishing their version of Islamic dominance in the region. Now, the TTP is back in full force, adding to Pakistan’s woes. A similar resurgence could occur if Pakistan’s only response to the Baloch Liberation Army’s (BLA) actions is military and kinetic in nature.
Without meaningful outreach to the local population and concrete efforts to demonstrate that Balochistan receives its fair share of national resources, the separatist movement is unlikely to weaken. Similar grievances exist in Sindh, as well as in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit-Baltistan.
Unlike Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) does not have an active, organised separatist movement. The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) is not separatist; rather, it is a civil rights movement that emerged in KP and the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), advocating for Pashtun rights, accountability for military operations, and an end to enforced disappearances. Although the state frequently accuses PTM of separatist tendencies, the movement itself denies any such agenda.
Things Can Spiral Out Of Control
Meanwhile, the TTP’s primary objective is to establish Sharia law in Pakistan, replacing the country’s democratic system with a Taliban-style Islamic Emirate governed by their interpretation of Sharia.
With Baloch separatism gaining momentum, a knee-jerk military response—Pakistan’s default approach—is likely to trigger a spiral of violence that will be increasingly difficult to control. Coupled with the persistent threat of TTP attacks and ongoing military operations along the Durand Line to maintain border sanctity, Pakistan’s security forces are preparing for a prolonged period of active engagement.
This escalation comes at a time when economic indicators suggest Pakistan is beginning to stabilise, with an estimated 3% GDP growth rate this year. However, prolonged military commitments could significantly undermine these gains. During Operation Zarb-e-Azb, nearly one-third of the Pakistan Army’s active infantry formations were engaged in counterterrorism operations. Given its current 360-degree security threats, Pakistan’s deep state may seek alternative strategies, including diversions it believes are manageable and within India’s threshold of tolerance.
However, in today’s evolving geopolitical landscape, banking on such a strategy without accurately assessing India’s potential response would be a risky gamble. India must remain vigilant against the possibility of a “copycat” deniable act of terror—one that could blend elements of recent trends in transnational terrorism.
(The writer is a Member of the National Disaster Management Authority, Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir, and Former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author