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Washington says the US military buildup on the northern coast of South America is aimed at “narco-terrorists”. A growing group of analysts disagree; They doubt what Trump is doing Administration is actually after the change of power Venezuela,
Nicolas Maduro, the country’s leader since 2013, is not taking any risks. In recent weeks they have reacted to moves by the Trump administration as if an invasion were imminent. Following the September emergency order and martial rhetoric about a “republic in arms”, Venezuela chairman Says militia and reservists are now mobilized across the country.
The Left leader has ordered the armed forces, police and militia Deploying to 284 battlefronts – A national defense posture that increases troops on sensitive borders. It has also deployed 25,000 troops near Colombia, a potential vector of infiltration.
In addition, approximately 4.5 million members of the National Bolivarian Militia, an auxiliary army created in 2005 and made up of civilian volunteers and reservists, have reportedly been mobilized. Civilians are being trained in weapons operations and tactics sessions by the armed forces to integrate local “people’s defence” committees into the defense architecture.
This place in Venezuela war The move comes after months of a US military buildup in the Caribbean. And there is no doubt that if it comes down to it, the US has a much larger and more sophisticated military than Venezuela.
But as an expert on Latin American politics, I suspect it may not be enough to remove Maduro from power – or to embolden opposition figures in Venezuela on Washington’s behalf. Indeed, any direct efforts to do so may only lead to a slow process that risks strengthening Maduro’s position.
powerful friends abroad
Even with nationwide domestic mobilization, the Venezuelan leader still has some very powerful international friends. Maduro has about 5,000 Russian Igla-S, man-portable anti-aircraft missiles deployed at key air-defense points. Although unverified, these reports indicate short-range air defense and anti-ship capabilities being supplied by countries friendly to the Maduro regime.
On October 28, a Russian Il-76 heavy cargo plane, operated by a sanctioned carrier associated with Russian military logistics, landed in Caracas after a multistop route through the Caucasus and West Africa. If not an explicit sign of solidarity, it is a sign that Russia can airlift advisers, parts, and munitions at will.
Iran’s long, silent hand is visible in Venezuela’s drone program. It was reportedly assembled with Mohajer-2 kits and expanded over the years into armed and surveillance platforms assembled at state plants by Tehran-trained technicians.
About the author
Robert Mugga is the co-founder of the Igarap Institute, a think&do tank in Brazil and the principal and co-founder of SecDev, a geopolitical and digital advisory group. He is also an Affiliated Scholar at Princeton University, a Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy, and received a DPhil from the University of Oxford.
This article was first published Conversation And it is republished under a Creative Commons license. read the original article,
For its part, Cuba has embedded intelligence and internal security advisers into Venezuela’s military services for more than a decade, a little-discussed force multiplier that helps the regime police dissidents and maintain loyalty.
Although Russia, Cuba, and Iran may help Maduro survive, they are unlikely to protect him from any determined US campaign.
cautious opposition
If Washington is hoping that its military pressure might encourage Venezuelans to take matters into their own hands, the domestic scenario is less favourable. Maduro’s opposition is, by most accounts, fragmented and weak after being deprived of victory in the 2024 vote by fraud and the year of repression that followed.
Following the disputed vote the Democratic Unitary Platform has split between a pressure wing and a participatory wing. The morale blow the opposition received on October 10, when opposition candidate for 2024 Maria Corina Machado actually won the Nobel Peace Prize, has yet to move the needle.
In my opinion, it is unlikely that the opposition could forcibly remove Maduro without a trigger, such as a major divide within the security services, sustained mass mobilization with elite defection, or large-scale US intervention.
A sudden elite split is unlikely given the regime’s domestic security architecture and control over the courts, prosecutors, and electoral council. Electoral displacement is also ineffective, as the official opposition is divided on strategy, faces daily repression, and Maduro has repeatedly signaled that he will not accept defeat – even if he loses.
Street power, backed by sustained international influence and US military threats, is arguably the opposition’s best asset.
Diaspora politics is feverish. South Florida’s large Venezuelan exile community reads naval construction as a potential turning point and lobbies accordingly, even if US immigration and travel policies go against their interests. Mainstream opposition leaders still maintain that change must come at Venezuelan hands, but more are openly applying external pressure to tilt the balance.
What can Washington do next
The Trump administration has certainly shown a willingness to pressure Maduro and embolden his opponents. Since August, the Pentagon has increased troops, destroyers and amphibious ships as part of the US Southern Command. Then, on 24 October, Washington attacked USS Gerald R. Redirected Ford Carrier Strike Group to the Caribbean.
Meanwhile, attacks against suspected drug vessels are likely to continue.
The campaign has already started Resulted in at least 13 attacks and 57 people were killed in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific. and president donald trump There have been consistent efforts to directly link the targeted cartels to the Venezuelan government and Maduro. Should the US wish to escalate, precision strikes on Venezuelan territory are not out of the question. With an aircraft carrier nearby and F-35s stationed in Puerto Rico, the Pentagon has options.
Meanwhile, any overt military posture will be accompanied by covert actions. The White House has openly declared that the CIA has the authority to operate inside Venezuela. an American Homeland Security agent Allegedly tried to recruit Maduro’s chief pilot The plot to send the President into US custody, which failed but now indicates an ongoing psychological operation. Meanwhile, Venezuela has condemned “military provocations” by the CIA and others.
It is worth remembering previous attempts to remove Maduro from office, including a 2018 drone attack on a Caracas parade and a failed freelance operation in 2020 that ended with the deaths and capture of dozens, including two former US soldiers. America has denied any connection with both the incidents.
In any event, such operations rarely overthrow the powerful – but they sow confusion and repression as the regime chases ghosts.
potential end game
If Washington’s real objective is regime change, the potential consequences are worrying. Certainly, a quick collapse of Maduro’s government is unlikely. A short, sharp campaign that dismantles the regime’s repressive instruments could trigger elite defection. Yet Cuba’s tight internal security, protection over generals and a siege mentality driven by sanctions have made a palace coup on a timetable favorable to Washington impossible.
In my view, a slow squeeze is likely.
What is realistic is a hybrid strategy involving maritime and air pressure, covert movement and inducement, targeted strikes to undermine the regime’s capacity, and political, legal and cyber warfare to isolate Caracas and divide the officer corps. But that path risks entrapping regime hardliners and worsening the humanitarian crisis, even as it reduces Maduro’s ability to deliver.
Analysts warn that the logic of regime change, once invoked, is difficult to test, especially if the attack kills civilians or attacks national symbols.
Boomerang is always possible. Military action would very likely stoke nationalist sentiment in Venezuela, shatter hemispheric consensus and push the United States into a protracted confrontation with messy implications, from uncontrolled migration to maritime security threats.
It is worth remembering that approximately 7.9 million migrants and refugees have already left Venezuela, of which more than 6.7 million live in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Even the successful fall of Maduro’s regime would not guarantee a successor capable of ruling the country.
At least three signposts matter in determining what happens next.
The first is the airlift cadence: more Russian cargo flights into Caracas pointing to accelerated military and technical assistance. Second, there is the breadth of US goals – an attack on a military installation or the presidential bunker would cross a political Rubicon, even if it was framed as a counter-narcotics operation. The third is opposition mobilization. If there are credible signs of Venezuelan demonstrations, protests, and action, it will shape Washington’s willingness to escalate tensions.
But even if the White House sticks to its existing counter-narcotics and terrorism narratives, all evidence points to a trajectory of incremental regime change with less than certain outcomes.